Wireless Sensor Networks Security: State of the Art by Al-Rakhami, Mabrook & Almowuena, Saleh
  
 
 
 1 
 
Wireless Sensor Networks Security:  
State of the Art 
Mabrook Al-Rakhami1, Student Member, IEEE, Saleh Almowuena2, Student Member, IEEE 
1College of Computer and Information Sciences, Research Chair of Pervasive and Mobile Computing, King Saud University, P.O. Box 51178, Riyadh 
11543, Saudi Arabia 
21College of Computer and Information Sciences, Department of Computer Engineering, King Saud University, P.O. Box 51178, Riyadh 11543, 
Saudi Arabia 
Corresponding author: Mabrook Al-Rakhami (e-mail: malrakhami@ksu.edu.sa). 
 
ABSTRACT Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have become one of the main research topics in computer 
science in recent years, primarily owing to the significant challenges imposed by these networks and their 
immense applicability. WSNs have been employed for a diverse group of monitoring applications, with 
emphasis on industrial control scenarios, traffic management, rescue operations, public safety, residential 
automation, weather forecasting, and several other fields. These networks constitute resource-constrained 
sensors for which security and energy efficiency are essential concerns. In this context, many research efforts 
have been focused on increasing the security levels and reducing the energy consumption in the network. 
This paper provides a state-of-the-art survey of recent works in this direction, proposing a new taxonomy for 
the security attacks and requirements of WSNs. 
INDEX TERMS Wireless sensor networks, Security, Security Requirements
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the last decade, there was a significant technological 
advance in the areas of sensors and wireless communication, 
leading to the invention of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) 
[1]. This type of network can provide diverse functionalities 
such as monitoring, tracking, processing, and even controlling 
operations in the physical world. For instance, sensors can be 
interconnected to monitor and control environmental 
conditions in a forest or oceans, and they can be applied in 
healthcare systems or industrial machinery. Recent advances 
in microelectronics stimulated the development of small 
sensors, which were coupled to small devices provided with 
wireless communication, with low processing capacity and 
limited computing resources. The collection of these sensor 
nodes working cooperatively forms a WSN. 
Despite the successful applications of WSNs in different 
fields, they have many drawbacks such as limitations in 
communication, processing, memory, and energy resources, 
which are, in most cases, due to their small batteries [2]. Fig. 
1 shows the WSN forecast. Despite different predictions for 
the near future of WSNs (blue bars), all companies believe that 
the long-term trend market of WSNs will grow (red line). 
These predictions reveal the importance of WSNs, and we can 
conceive that our world will be significantly affected by the 
technologies involving WSNs [3].  
Depending on the energy consumed by the sensor nodes, a 
WSN can operate for days or years; however, considering the 
difficulties of access to node locations, battery replacement 
may become impractical. 
The security of the information processed by the nodes is of 
critical importance as these nodes can be deployed in diverse 
environments, such as for monitoring an oil well. Based on the 
nature of wireless communication, precedents are set for the 
most diverse types of information attacks. Thus, providing 
information security is a major problem in WSNs, which is the 
focus of several studies.  
Cryptographic algorithms require significant energy 
consumption, processing, and memory. In general, 
cryptographic and authentication algorithms provide the 
services of confidentiality, integrity, and authentication, and 
hence, choosing the appropriate mechanisms is important for 
protecting the WSN data [4].  
However, choosing an appropriate encryption algorithm 
would not entirely solve the energy consumption problem, as 
any implemented algorithm will influence the power 
consumption. Therefore, it is important to add security 
management to the system. 
A security management system can act on a network by 
enabling and disabling security services and functions, 
whenever necessary, in response to events occurring over the 
network. This system can save network power if there is no 
indication or suspicion of intruders [5]. 
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However, with the use of only an encryption algorithm and 
security level management, it is difficult to guarantee that the 
data is legitimate and did not suffer any type of attack. In this 
context, many authors [6-9] proposed models to estimate the 
level of security of the arriving data; consequently, the user 
can choose whether to use this data according to the level of 
security. Nevertheless, energy consumption can be improved 
by deploying an alternative secret sharing mechanism to the 
known public keys [10].  
This paper provides an overview of the key challenges and 
trends in WSN security research, demonstrating solutions to 
problems and discussing the feasibility of using counterpoint 
solutions with increased power consumption, processing, and 
memory. Thus, this paper aims to provide an orientation of the 
techniques and mechanisms to be used in research related to 
WSN security.   
 
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
A.  SECURITY OF WSNs 
Security of WSNs should be considered in several 
applications. For example, if we place sensors in an oil well to 
detect drilling data in order to execute it in the best possible 
way, those responsible for collecting the data require the data 
to be reliable, with no interference, alteration, or inclusion of 
false data. Hence, a network should have the capacity to 
provide data integrity, confidentiality, authenticity, and 
availability, as well as be resistant to attacks [11]. This section 
presents the main security concepts of WSNs. 
B. BASIC CHARACTERISTICS 
In this subsection, we will cover an overview of the 
essential characteristics required to ensure the security in 
WSNs, which include: 
Data Integrity: Data integrity aims to ensure that all the 
original data attributes generated in the sensing node are 
maintained during the routing to the base station throughout 
the data life cycle [12]. 
Confidentiality: The right to access information must be 
provided only to the nodes with the authorization to access it 
[13]. 
Authenticity: It aims to ensure that the data remains the 
same as that produced by the source node, without any 
modification or mutation along the way [14].  
Availability: Availability is fundamental, as this allows the 
data to be always available to authorized users [15]. 
C. MOST COMMON ATTACKS ON WSN 
Generally, all the attacks of WSNs are aimed at network 
malfunction or interruption of service. Therefore, the attacks 
are executed in several ways. 
Table I presents a list of the common security threats and their 
solutions. In the following section, we briefly discuss the main 
attacks related to WSNs. 
1. Denial-of-service (DOS): 
This type of attack is used against web servers. It invalidates 
the network using an overload, aiming to consume all the 
memory and processing capacity of the network, in order to 
interrupt the services provided by the network [16-18]. DOS 
can be classified into the following attacks: 
Flood attack: A network with unnecessary packets generates 
a large volume of traffic [19]. 
Amplification attack: A malicious node forges the victim's 
address and sends a large number of requests to the other 
nodes on behalf of the victim node; when all other nodes start 
responding to the requests, the victim node becomes congested 
[20]. 
Exploiting protocol weaknesses: This attack explores 
implementation failures in the victim's protocol. Accordingly, 
DoS attack easily interrupts the operation of the network, as 
the network devices are provided with low memory and 
processing capacity [21, 22].  
Wormhole attack: It is a critical attack especially in the 
neighbor discovery phase, as this attack creates a tunnel 
between two nodes in different partitions of the network, 
leading the nodes to believe that they are neighbors while there 
are other knots between them, and accordingly, causing a 
convergence problem in the network [23, 24].  
Hello flood attack: A fake node with high processing power 
and high signal power floods the network with HELLO 
messages, causing congestion throughout the network. 
Moreover, every other node believes that this false knot is a 
neighbor, and may also create false routes [25, 26].  
Black hole attack: This is also called a sinkhole attack, where 
a malicious node shows false routes to the entire network, 
causing packets to pass through this false node before reaching 
the base station. This malicious node can discard or modify 
the routed packages [27, 28]. 
2. Routing attacks: 
As the name of the attack suggests, the malicious node 
changes the routing, creating infinite loops or large deviations 
between nodes [29, 30]. 
3. Jamming attack: 
A malicious node has a powerful transceiver configured to use 
the same frequency as the sensor nodes, which can occupy the 
communication channel with noise and prevent the sensor 
nodes from receiving messages [31-33]. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1.  Wireless sensor network forecast 
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4. Sybil attacks: 
A malicious node assumes the pseudonymous identity of one 
or more legitimate nodes and subsequently executes various 
types of attacks on the network, including attacks on data 
aggregation, routing mechanisms, resource allocation, or 
distributed storage [23, 34-36].  
5. Message modification: 
A malicious node captures a message and retransmits it in an 
altered way [37].  
 
6. Data negligence and selective forwarding: 
The intruder node ignores the messages that must be sent or 
retransmitted [38]. 
7. Node capture and compromised node: 
 Most of the WSNs are operated in open environments. The 
small design of the sensors and the distributed nature of their 
deployment results in many vulnerabilities such as extracting 
cryptographic keys, tampering with the associated circuitry, 
changing the code of the sensors, and replacing sensors with 
malicious nodes that are controlled by the attacker[1]. 
D. WSN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
1. Cryptography: 
In general, cryptography involves applying a set of techniques, 
concepts, and methods to information in order to transform it 
into coded information, such that only the legitimate receiver 
of the information can decipher it [39]. 
2. Encryption: 
It involves the process of transforming common information 
into coded information using a cryptographic algorithm. In the 
case of WSNs, data can be encrypted via an end-to-end or hop-
to-hop process [40]. In the hop-to-hop process, encryption is 
performed each time the message passes through a different 
node until it reaches the base station. In this type of encryption, 
all neighbors must share the necessary keys for the process. In 
the end-to-end process, encryption is performed once per 
message; i.e., in a transmission, only the destination node and 
base station must encrypt/decrypt the message, rendering this 
process less expensive than the hop-to-hop process [41]. 
3. Message signature: 
The signature of a message is intended to convince the 
recipient node that the message was generated by the sending 
node. The signature can be generated via the end-to-end 
processes and hop-to-hop processes [42]. 
4. Key management:  
In the case of WSNs, public key sharing, which is commonly 
used in various types of networks, is unfeasible owing to the 
high cost of processing and power consumption. Sharing 
private keys is one way, but it renders the network very  
vulnerable because a network node can be hijacked, and the 
hijacker takes possession of the shared private key [43, 44].  
5. Intrusion detection system (IDS) 
An intrusion detection system aims to detect various types of 
malicious behaviors in the network, generating alerts from 
events. If an intrusion is detected, alerts are sent, and two types 
of response are possible: active and passive [45, 46]. In active 
response, malicious behavior is handled by the system itself, 
whereas in passive response, the system only generates reports 
such that the network administrator can observe and respond 
appropriately.  
Owing to the collaborative and distributed nature of the 
WSNs, the ideal case is to use a collaborative and distributed 
TABLE I 
WSN SECURITY THREATS AND SOLUTIONS [1] 
Security threats Security 
requirement 
Possible security 
solutions 
Unauthenticated or 
unauthorized access 
Key establishment 
and trust setup 
Random key 
distribution,  public 
key cryptography 
Message disclosure Confidentiality and 
privacy 
Link/network layer, 
encryption, access 
control  
Message 
modification 
Integrity and 
authenticity 
Keyed secure hash 
function, digital 
signature  
Denial-of-service 
(DoS) 
Availability Intrusion detection, 
redundancy 
Node capture and 
compromised node 
Resilience to node 
compromise 
Inconsistency 
detection and node 
revocation, tamper-
proofing 
Routing attacks Secure routing Secure routing 
protocols 
Intrusion and high-
level security attacks 
Secure group 
management, 
intrusion detection, 
secure data 
aggregation 
Secure group 
communication, 
intrusion detection 
Security threats Security requirement Possible security 
solutions 
Unauthenticated or 
unauthorized access 
Key establishment 
and trust setup 
Random key 
distribution,  public 
key cryptography 
Message disclosure Confidentiality and 
privacy 
Link/network layer, 
encryption, access 
control  
Message 
modification 
Integrity and 
authenticity 
Keyed secure hash 
function, digital 
signature  
Denial-of-service 
(DoS) 
Availability Intrusion detection, 
redundancy 
Node capture and 
compromised node 
Resilience to node 
compromise 
Inconsistency 
detection and node 
revocation, tamper-
proofing 
Routing attacks Secure routing Secure routing 
protocols 
Intrusion and high-
level security attacks 
Secure group 
management, 
intrusion detection, 
secure data 
aggregation 
Secure group 
communication, 
intrusion detection 
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IDS. In these mechanisms, each sensor node monitors its 
neighbors for any suspicious behavior.  
As soon as malicious activity is detected, neighbors exchange 
information about the suspect node. In this collaborative 
process, each neighbor sensor of a suspect node must indicate 
its point of view about this node to indicate if it is malicious or 
legitimate.  
6. Trust management system: 
Security management mechanisms exist to assess the 
reliability of sensor nodes, which can evaluate, maintain, and 
revoke trust between nodes. Usually, in the WSN context, the 
notion of trust is shown as follows: a node A relies on node B 
to execute process Y. This trust can be used for access control, 
secure routing, and intrusion detection [47, 48]. 
7. Security and power management: 
Power management involves turning the device components 
on and off to maximize the life of the network via energy 
saving. As the use of security increases the energy 
consumption, security management becomes crucial [49]. 
This is to enable or disable security modules deployed in the 
network following the parameters defined by the network 
designer. 
III. RELATED WORK 
In this section, we analyze studies related to the security of 
WSNs. The general taxonomy of recent works in this field for 
the last five years is divided based on a main category and sub-
category as shown in Fig. 3. Table 2 summarizes all the 
references of our taxonomy. 
A. OVERVIEW 
The authors in [215] addressed the global issues and 
challenges encountered in conserving power and security of 
WSNs. Power and security of WSNs are aggravated especially 
if the sensor is placed in environments where battery or sensor 
replacement is difficult. The authors discussed the main 
factors that increase energy consumption such as idle 
listening, collisions, overhearing, and overhead control 
packets. The authors explored energy conservation techniques 
currently being used such as duty cycling, mobility-based 
approaches, clustering, and game theory, and subsequently 
compared these techniques to demonstrate the approaches 
with the highest and lowest values of the following factors: 
idle listening, collisions, overhearing, control packets, energy 
saving, and time consumption. Eventually, they concluded 
that the priority-based technique was the best among the 
mentioned approaches. 
In [216, 217], the authors discussed WSNs attacks 
such as DOS, Sybil attack, wormhole attack, Hello flood 
attack, and black hole attack, proposed some security schemes 
for these attacks, and demonstrated their main features. 
Although the articles provide a direction for the mechanism to 
be used for energy conservation, they did not directly relate 
security to energy consumption. However, they described the 
main problems of energy conservation and security well, in 
addition to the difficulties in overcoming these problems, and 
proposed schemes for solving them. 
 
FIGURE 2.  WSN security requirements 
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TABLE 2 
RECENT STUDIES OF WSN SECURITY [1] 
Categories Sub-categories Publications 
Generic Survey - [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] 
[56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] 
[62] [63] [64] [65] [66] [54] 
Cryptography Asymmetric [67] [68] [69] [70] [4] [71] 
[72] [73] [74] [75] 
Symmetric [76] [77] [78] [79] [80] [81] 
[82] [83] [84] [85] [86] [87] 
[88] [89] [90] 
Secure Data 
Aggregation 
- [91] [92] [93] [94] [95] [96] 
[97] [98] [99] [100] [101] 
[102] [103] [104] [105] [106] 
[107] [108] [109] [110] [111] 
[112] 
Secure Routing - [113] [114] [115] [116] [117] 
[118] [119] [120] [121] [122] 
[123] [124] [125] [126] [127] 
[128] 
Secure 
Localization 
- [129] [130] [131] [132] [129] 
[133] [134] [135] [136] [137]  
[138] [139] [140] [141] [142] 
[129] 
Key 
Management 
- [143] [144] [145] [146] [147, 
148] [43] [149] [150] 
Location 
Aware Security 
- [151] [152] [153] [154] [132] 
[155] [156] [157] [158, 159] 
Attacks Sybil [160] [161] [162] [163] [164] 
[165] [166] [167] [168] [169] 
[170] [171] [172] [173] [174] 
[175] [176] 
Wormhole [177] [178] [179] [180] [181] 
[182] [183] [184] [185] [186] 
[187] [188] [189] [190]  
DOS [191] [192] [193] [194] [195] 
[196] [197] [198] [199] [200] 
[201] [192] 
Node Replication [202] [203] [204] [205] [206] 
[207] [208] [209] [210] [211] 
Node Compromise [212] [213] [102] [214]  
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B. CRYPTOGRAPHY 
The work in [218] demonstrated a performance evaluation of 
the security mechanisms for WSNs precisely, by analyzing the 
performance of the following cryptographic algorithms: 
AKGBE, novel stream cipher cryptosystem, fast and secure 
stream cipher, RC4, DES, and Blowfish. The authors 
presented many cryptography optimization algorithms for the 
key creation and encryption process, which is the ant colony 
optimization key generation-based image encryption method. 
The experiment was carried out using different parameters and 
the results were compared with the previous techniques to 
demonstrate the accuracy. The metrics considered in the 
evaluation of each algorithm were the maximum number of 
keys stored, battery capacity, and runtime. 
In [219], the authored performed a performance 
evaluation of searchable symmetric encryption in WSNs. 
They examined four cryptographic hash functions—MD5, 
SHA1, SHA2, and SHA3—using the double hashing 
technique and truncating message digests. Moreover, they 
elected five symmetric encryption algorithms and two fast 
hash functions along with double hashing. They concluded 
that the best strategy for securing indexes was AES plus a fast 
FNV hash function and double hashing. The results showed 
that the integration of encryption algorithms with a fast hash 
function offers better results than using a cryptographic hash 
function alone. They concluded that using AES+FNV and the 
double hashing technique would improve the security level 
with acceptable power consumption. 
C. SECURE DATA AGGREGATION 
As the sensor nodes can generate a large amount of redundant 
data, similar packets of multiple nodes can be aggregated to 
reduce the number of transmissions. Data aggregation is the 
combination of data from different sources according to some 
aggregation function. This technique has been used to achieve 
energy optimization and data transfer in a series of routing 
protocols. Signal processing methods can also be used for data 
aggregation. In this case, data aggregation refers to data fusion 
when a node is capable of producing a more accurate output 
signal by using some techniques to combine input signals and 
reduce noise in these signals. After the data collection and 
during its transfer to the main server, each sensor along the 
routing path cooperatively combines and secures the fragment 
messages.  
Ensuring the security of in-network data aggregation 
has been the focus of many studies. The problem of data 
aggregation using encryption was introduced in [3] and further 
refined in [2]. The work in [94,95] proposed a secure 
information aggregation protocol to aggregate the data 
collected from the WSN nodes. The authors in [80] proposed 
symmetric-key-based homomorphic primitives for end-to-end 
secure data aggregation in WSNs to prevent redundant data 
transmission in data aggregation. 
D. KEY MANAGEMENT 
Many WSN security implementations use encryption and key 
management schemes. The main problem is to make the 
management scheme adequately efficient such that, if an 
intruder captures or attacks a node, it is not possible for them 
to access all the keys of the network and thus the confidential 
information of the system. Different authors investigated and 
proposed solutions for the security of the WSNs by making 
assumptions regarding the capacity of the different nodes. As 
mentioned before, sensors have limited processing, storage, 
and power capabilities. However, it is possible to locate a 
small group of nodes whose resources are not limited, called a 
cluster leader. In these cases, the network is considered 
heterogeneous. In the case where all nodes have the same 
characteristics, the network is considered a homogeneous 
network. 
E. SECRET SHARING 
Sharing mechanisms have been initiated by Shamir [220] to 
provide security for cryptographic keys. Thus, the work in 
[221] demonstrated a secret sharing-based key management 
scheme for sharing secrets in WSNs. It demonstrated the 
feasibility of collaborative security solutions on devices with 
 
FIGURE 3.  WSN security: taxonomy of recent works 
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good processing and storage capacity and contributed to the 
applications where collaboration among network nodes is 
required as a reliable mechanism.  
The authors minimized the size of WSN clusters to 
adjust the overall energy consumption of the WSN. In contrast 
to some previous clustered architectural solutions, the notable 
improvement of this paper was that they discussed challenging 
security issues from the point of localizing key things based 
on the secret-sharing theory. The authors carried out the 
network key and cluster key and generated new keys from 
various polynomials using the Lagrange interpolation 
formula. Moreover, they invented a re-key mechanism in the 
cluster head election with low energy consumption. 
F. AUTONOMIC MANAGEMENT 
Management involves handling something to obtain the best 
possible performance in several areas of performance, 
whereas autonomy indicates to do something independently 
where a concrete action (external intervention) is not required 
for making necessary changes. In this sense, the autonomic 
management in WSN is to save as much energy as possible, 
and accordingly, we can turn off the transistor of the device 
when it is idle as the radio is the component consuming the 
most energy [222].  
Another way to improve energy consumption is by 
managing the security levels autonomously; by increasing or 
reducing the security using an automatic procedure when 
necessary, the consumption will be lower when the network 
feels safe, and security is not required. As sensor networks 
have low processing capacity and available energy, it is 
extremely important that the consumption of processing, 
memory, and energy is minimized, while not neglecting the 
security of the system. Therefore, this dilemma leads us to 
develop several ways to maintain a secure WSN.  
One of the alternatives is by using a node management model 
in an autonomous way, where the nodes increase the level of 
security in the network (depending on the current state of the 
network). If there is no threat, the network can maintain itself 
with as little security as possible, and if there is an attack or 
threat, the level of security begins to grow at well-defined 
levels.  
The work in [223] proposed a security management 
model for WSNs, including the selection of security 
components, description of management information, 
description of messages, and event definition in an autonomic 
network. Among the several security problems, the author 
considered the possibility of hop-to-hop and end-to-end 
encryption, the use of key management techniques, the 
existence of intrusion detection mechanisms, secure routing, 
aggregation of data, and node revocation scheme. Autonomic 
decisions were made by using an extension of their model, 
referred to as "MannaNMP," where the security components 
have dynamic configuration and messaging, and hence, they 
can be included, deleted, activated, and deactivated at run time 
using control messages. 
These security components are based on intrusion 
detection events, and hence, the level of network security 
increases every time an attacker is detected. If the threat is 
perceived by the base station, it revokes the intruder node; if it 
is perceived by any of the other nodes, the base station 
increases the level of security. This level of security was 
divided by the author into four categories as follows: 
- Low: No intruder detection at sensor nodes, no 
encryption, data fusion enabled; 
- Medium: 10% of the nodes perform intrusion detection, 
updating authenticated end-to-end routes, hop-by-hop 
encryption enabled, data fusion enabled, alternate routes;  
- High: 20% of nodes perform intrusion detection, end-to-
end encryption enabled, authenticated hop-to-hop route 
updating, alternate routes, no data merging; 
- Critical: 30% of nodes perform intrusion detection, no 
data fusion, end-to-end and hop-to-hop encryption 
enabled, authenticated hop-to-hop and end-to-end routes, 
alternate routes. 
Notably, every time the level of security increases, there 
is a significant increase in the energy consumption and 
processing; therefore, if the network has a low amount of 
energy available, the security levels may be reduced even after 
the detection of intruders to ensure that the network does not 
stop functioning owing to power failure. 
In order to validate the model described, the author 
performed simulations using a flat stationary network based 
on the model known as a hive for node arrangement, which 
varies between 50 and 1000. Each node has six known 
neighbors, all of which have the same computational resources 
and functionalities. Furthermore, the base station is defined. It 
is the source or destination of all the data and control packages. 
It has unlimited resources and cannot be violated. 
After the evaluation of the security levels according to the 
criterion of energy consumption, the following average 
differences were obtained: from low to medium level, the 
increase in energy consumption was 9.9%; from medium to 
high, the increase was 18.7%; from high to critical, the 
increase was 8%; and from the low direct level to critical, the 
increase was 40%—thus confirming that the energy cost to use 
security is high, but via autonomic management, it can be 
improved. The evaluation emphasizes the biggest problem in 
WSNs, which is the energy efficiency and inclusion of 
security mechanisms. However, an interesting focus would be 
to evaluate the processing and consumption of RAM before 
the levels suggested by the author. 
Despite extensive investigation of WSN security, it is not 
possible to guarantee a 100% secure network, owing to the 
unreliability of the communication channel, in addition to the 
exposure of the nodes to physical attacks. Several security 
mechanisms can be used to defend the network; however, if a 
security guarantee is required, the user is aware of the 
reliability of the network. Thus, the authors of [Sensor data 
security level estimation scheme for wireless sensor networks] 
presented the sensor data security level estimation scheme 
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(SDSE), which is a new comprehensive scheme to estimate 
the level of data security of sensor networks based on their 
security mechanisms. 
The level of security assists the user in deciding whether 
to use the data received. Moreover, the security level 
calculation can also be used to help experts make decisions 
about the evaluation of different security mechanisms and 
modification of the network settings to improve security (a 
sound and practical approach to quantifying security risk in 
enterprise networks + empirical analysis of system-level 
vulnerability metrics using actual attacks + an analytical 
hierarchical process-based risk assessment method for 
wireless networks). 
According to the author, the SDSE model demonstrated 
in the article differs from the other related works in that the 
SDSE defines metrics that consider resilience and reliability 
based on the information revealing the current state of the 
network. The SDSE model uses stochastic methods as the 
metrics: the probability of cryptographic strength, probability 
of key management resilience, probability of legitimacy, and 
probability of delivery. The work considered four security 
mechanisms, two for prevention, i.e., cryptography and 
cryptographic key management, and two for detection, i.e., 
IDS and trust management system. 
We can obtain the security level for data originating in a 
sensor node when it reaches the base station by the calculation 
of the metrics in each node by using the probabilities 
calculated. Each node on a given route has a degree of 
security, and the security level of the data will be the value of 
the lowest degree of security on the route. The author tested 
the prevention metrics using the known algorithm RC5 and 
observed that the greater the cryptographic strength of the 
algorithm, the more secure it is. Although with an increase in 
the time spent, the probability of cryptographic strength 
decreases, as more keys can be tested. In the case of resilience, 
it was observed that the higher the number of nodes captured, 
the lower the probability of resilience. Furthermore, the author 
observed that the probability of legitimacy decreases as more 
neighbors are required to detect the malicious node. 
In general, the level of security is affected by all the 
parameters used in the metrics. The model proved to be 
feasible as the effective extraction of the parameters of the 
mechanisms was demonstrated with examples. Thus, the 
importance of the article is remarkable, but as the model was 
not effectively tested in WSNs with different security 
mechanisms, it is not possible to estimate the performance of 
the model. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this work, a survey on the state-of-the-art works in WSNs 
was presented, and a new taxonomy for the security 
requirements was proposed. As future work, the scope of the 
work may be expanded by adding additional investigations 
and referring to more experiments carried out by authors to 
illustrate their conclusions with regard to WSNs security. 
These tests can be added to the proposed security schemes, and 
a global analysis involving both problems and their possible 
solutions can be performed. The security mechanisms and 
performance metrics, such as network latency, should be 
evaluated. It is important to evaluate the impact of the different 
schemes and models in terms of energy consumption, 
processing, and memory in order to achieve viability to WSNs. 
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